The Houthi advance towards Bab el-Mandeb could turn geography into a strategic multiplier, increasing pressure on trade and regional security.
The latest Houthi offensive along Yemen’s western coast has brought the country back to the centre of regional security dynamics. On 10 September 2026, United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg told the Security Council that the risk of a return to large-scale conflict, which he had warned about the previous month, had become a reality. The capture of Mokha, a strategic port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, and the subsequent Houthi advance towards the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have significantly altered the strategic significance of the conflict.
The implications extend far beyond Yemen. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and constitutes a crucial segment of the maritime route linking Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal. The Houthi advance therefore raises a broader question: to what extent can a non-state actor use its geographical position to influence one of the world’s most important maritime corridors?
The answer does not necessarily depend on the Houthis’ ability to close or permanently control the strait. Their strategic leverage may instead derive from their capacity to make navigation through Bab el-Mandeb riskier, more expensive and less predictable. Geography, combined with asymmetric military capabilities, can thus act as a force multiplier, allowing Ansar Allah to generate consequences far beyond its conventional military weight.
FROM A LOCAL MOVEMENT TO A REGIONAL ACTOR
Formally known as Ansar Allah, the Houthi movement emerged from the political and religious environment of northern Yemen. Rooted in Zaydism, a branch of Shia Islam historically established in the north of the country, the movement gradually became militarised during the 2000s. Its capture of Sana’a in 2014 represented a decisive turning point, transforming the Houthis from a predominantly local insurgent movement into an actor capable of controlling a significant part of Yemen.
Their rise, however, cannot be explained exclusively through their relationship with Iran. The Houthis have domestic political and social roots that predate their growing ties with Tehran. At the same time, Iranian support has contributed to the development of their military capabilities through weapons, training, intelligence assistance and missile and drone technology.
For this reason, defining Ansar Allah simply as an Iranian proxy risks obscuring its degree of autonomy. The relationship is better understood as a strategic partnership based on converging interests. The Houthis seek to consolidate their position within Yemen and increase their regional relevance, while Iran benefits from the presence of an armed partner capable of exerting pressure on its regional adversaries and on strategic maritime routes. This convergence does not require Tehran to exercise direct control over every Houthi decision.
BAB EL-MANDEB: THE POWER OF GEOGRAPHY
Bab el-Mandeb lies between Yemen and the Horn of Africa and represents one of the most important maritime chokepoints in international trade. Its relevance has increased further in 2026 because of the simultaneous pressure affecting other energy routes in the Middle East.
Figure 2. Map of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, showing its strategic position between Yemen and the Horn of Africa and the maritime connection between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Image Source: Wikimedia Commons, Map of Bab-el-Mandeb, Archer90/OpenStreetMap, CC BY-SA 3.0. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Bab-el-Mandeb.png
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately 8.1 million barrels per day of crude oil and other petroleum liquids passed through Bab el-Mandeb during the second quarter of 2026, compared with 5.4 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025. The increase partly reflects the growing importance of the Red Sea as an alternative route while flows through the Strait of Hormuz have been disrupted.
The strategic relevance of a chokepoint, however, does not depend exclusively on its physical occupation. Even a limited but credible threat can influence the behaviour of shipping companies, insurers and governments. The Houthis do not need conventional naval superiority to produce this effect. Missiles, drones and other asymmetric capabilities can raise the expected cost of operating in the area and force stronger actors to devote substantial resources to protecting maritime traffic.
Controlling Bab el-Mandeb is therefore not necessary in order to influence its use. The ability to make passage through the strait more dangerous, expensive and unpredictable may itself constitute a significant source of strategic leverage.
FROM MARITIME ATTACKS TO TERRITORIAL PRESSURE
The Houthis have already demonstrated their ability to affect international shipping. Their attacks on vessels in the Red Sea from late 2023 onwards prompted major shipping companies to divert vessels away from the Suez route and towards the Cape of Good Hope. According to UN Trade and Development, these diversions increased distances, transit times and operating costs, while also producing wider consequences for ports and global supply chains.
The latest territorial developments add a new dimension to this threat. After taking Mokha, Houthi forces continued their advance southwards. On 11 September, Reuters reported that Houthi forces had reached Perim, also known as Mayun, in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
This does not automatically give Ansar Allah the ability to close the strait. It does, however, change the strategic environment. A stronger territorial presence near Bab el-Mandeb, combined with missiles and drones, increases the credibility of the threat against maritime traffic. Geography and asymmetric capabilities reinforce each other: territorial proximity makes interdiction easier, while long-range weapons allow the Houthis to exert pressure without establishing conventional naval dominance.
The result is an asymmetric form of power. Relatively inexpensive systems can force states and commercial actors to invest considerably greater resources in interception, protection, insurance and alternative routes.
IRAN, HORMUZ AND SAUDI ARABIA
The strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb becomes even clearer when considered alongside the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia can reduce its dependence on Hormuz through the East-West Pipeline, which transports oil from the eastern part of the kingdom to the Red Sea. Yet this alternative still leaves Saudi exports dependent on secure navigation through the Red Sea and, ultimately, Bab el-Mandeb.
Pressure on both chokepoints would therefore create a more complex strategic problem. Disruption around Hormuz increases the value of alternative routes, but growing insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb simultaneously reduces their reliability. For Iran, the existence of an allied armed actor capable of exerting pressure near the southern entrance to the Red Sea consequently provides additional strategic depth.
Saudi Arabia faces the opposite dilemma. Riyadh must secure its energy infrastructure and maritime exports while avoiding a return to the costly military involvement in Yemen that characterised much of the previous decade. Recent developments show how difficult that balance may become. On 9 September, Reuters reported Houthi ballistic-missile and drone attacks against Abha, Khamis Mushait and Jazan, illustrating how the maritime and territorial dimensions of the confrontation are increasingly interconnected.
WHAT COMES NEXT?
In the short term, a complete and prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb remains a less likely scenario than selective disruption. Attempting to shut the strait entirely would risk triggering a much broader military response from regional and international actors whose economic and security interests depend on freedom of navigation.
A more sustainable strategy for the Houthis may therefore consist of maintaining a credible capacity to threaten shipping while calibrating the intensity of attacks according to regional developments. Such an approach would preserve strategic leverage without necessarily crossing the threshold that could provoke a large-scale international intervention.
Three variables will determine whether the current Houthi advance produces a lasting change in the regional balance.
The first is territorial consolidation. Capturing strategic positions is different from holding them. The ability of Ansar Allah to maintain control of positions around Bab el-Mandeb in the face of counter-offensives will determine whether geography becomes a durable strategic asset.
The second is the evolution of the wider confrontation involving Iran. If pressure on Hormuz persists, Bab el-Mandeb will become even more important for energy exports and international shipping. In that scenario, Houthi control of positions near the strait would acquire greater strategic value.
The third is the Saudi and international response. A significant expansion of Houthi attacks could encourage Riyadh to intensify military operations and seek greater external support. The response of the United States will be particularly important because freedom of navigation in the Red Sea remains a major strategic interest for Washington.
The indicators to watch are therefore clear: the Houthis’ ability to retain their territorial gains, the frequency and sophistication of attacks on commercial and military vessels, changes in shipping routes and insurance costs, and any adjustment in the Saudi or U.S. military posture.
CONCLUSION
The Houthi advance towards Bab el-Mandeb demonstrates how geography can transform the strategic weight of a non-state actor. Ansar Allah does not need to achieve conventional naval superiority to influence one of the world’s most important maritime routes. It only needs to maintain a credible capacity to raise the economic and military costs associated with its use.
This is the central strategic significance of Bab el-Mandeb. The combination of territorial proximity, missiles, drones and regional partnerships enables the Houthis to impose costs on actors with far greater conventional resources.
In the coming months, the key question will therefore not simply be whether the Houthis can control Bab el-Mandeb, but whether they can convert their territorial advance into a durable instrument of coercion. If they consolidate their positions while maintaining the ability to selectively threaten navigation, the strait could become a long-term source of leverage for Ansar Allah. If, instead, Saudi and international pressure prevents territorial consolidation, the current advance may prove temporary.
Bab el-Mandeb is thus more than a territorial objective. For the Houthis, it is a strategic multiplier capable of turning local military gains into regional and potentially global influence.
