With the fall of El Fasher, the RSF consolidates its control over Darfur. And Abu Dhabi strengthens its regional influence.
In recent days, Sudan’s civil war has reached a significant turning point: the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured the city of El Fasher, seizing it from the regular army after an 18-month siege that left tens of thousands of civilians trapped without food or humanitarian aid.
The fall of El Fasher gives the RSF control over all major urban centers in Darfur, consolidating its dominance in the region.
This development exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and the fragmentation of power, while raising the prospect of Sudan’s de facto partition, with Darfur increasingly beyond Khartoum’s reach.
Overview of the civil war in Sudan
Often described as the forgotten conflict, Sudan’s civil war has raged for two and a half years, fueling one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises.
The current power struggle pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against the RSF, commanded by former warlord Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Their rivalry dates back to 2019, when the two forces cooperated to overthrow Omar al-Bashir, only to split over control of the post-coup transition.
Hostilities formally erupted on April 15, 2023, with intense fighting in Khartoum that marked a decisive escalation in their power struggle. Originally created by Bashir as an Arab counter-insurgency militia to suppress the Darfur rebellion more than two decades ago, the RSF has since evolved into a powerful paramilitary force.
Since the war began, various countries have supported opposing sides to advance their own strategic and economic interests in Sudan and the region.
The conflict thus intertwines political ambition, ethnic tensions, and foreign intervention, making it one of the most complex crises in Africa today.
Interests of the United Arab Emirates in Sudan
Among the international actors most deeply involved, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stands out.
The capture of El Fasher likely would not have occurred without direct or indirect support from Abu Dhabi, which (despite official denials) has reportedly supplied the RSF with weapons, logistics, propaganda and diplomatic backing since before the war’s formal outbreak in 2023.
According to several sources, the UAE maintains two operational bases in Sudan, at Nyala (South Darfur) and al-Malha, roughly 200 kilometers from El Fasher.
These connect to a wider supply network stretching through Bosaso (Somalia), al-Kufra (southern Libya) and Kajjansi Airport (Uganda), a system that underscores the UAE’s growing military and commercial footprint across Sudan and the Horn of Africa.
In return, Hemedti has provided Abu Dhabi with privileged access to gold from RSF-controlled mines, mercenaries from western Sudan, and influence within a vast, resource-rich, and strategically positioned territory.
Geopolitically, Sudan is in fact crucial to the UAE’s ambitions: it borders the Red Sea, through which around 10% of global trade passes, and lies near the Suez Canal, a key chokepoint linking Asia, Europe, and the Americas. By projecting influence over this corridor, the UAE can link the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, establishing a commercial and military arc from the Persian Gulf to East Africa.
This strategy mirrors the UAE’s approach in Yemen, where it supports the Southern Transitional Council, controlling key ports and islands to secure its maritime dominance. Such expansion allows Abu Dhabi to diversify trade routes and reduce reliance on the Iran-influenced Strait of Hormuz.
Ultimately, Sudan’s war is not merely a domestic struggle for power, it is also part of a broader Emirati strategy to secure control over critical nodes of global trade and consolidate its geopolitical reach.
Possible developments
The RSF, emboldened by its victories in Darfur, may seek to expand eastward and eventually launch a renewed offensive on Khartoum, which the regular army recaptured last May.
The support of the United Arab Emirates represents an additional factor of strength and security for the RSF, guaranteeing supplies, diplomatic cover, and economic resources that consolidate its position on the ground.
However, a possible return of fighting in the capital would risk aggravating the humanitarian crisis and prolonging a conflict increasingly influenced by external interests, in which Sudan remains a crucial hub of geopolitical competition in the Red Sea.
